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Daniel Webster as Tocqueville's Lawyer:
The Dartmouth College Case Again
by R. KENT NEWMYER*

D

every schoolboy knows,
and a conservative one-i.e., his legal efforts were made consistently in behalf of the commercial elite. From 1814 until his
death in 1852, he argued 168 cases before the Supreme Court (in
addition to his practice in state and lower federal courts). Among
this number were many of the leading constitutional cases of the
formative period of American law-McCulloch v. Maryland (1819),
Dartmouth College v. Woodward (1819), Gibbons v. Ogden (1824),
Ogden v. Saunders (1827), and Charles River Bridge v. Warren
Bridge (1837), to mention only the most outstanding. Given the
prominence of Webster's legal career, it is remarkable that so little
effort to understand it has been made. Abundant celebrations of
his legal logic, eloquence, and nationalism there have been--enough,
indeed, to embalm Webster in his own reputation. Not yet, however,
has there been a study of Webster the lawyer which deals fully
with his technique of advocacy, his legal philosophy, his professional and class ties, and the mutual complementarity of his legal
and political careers.' Needed in such a study is an organizing
theme which goes beyond the ordinary case-by-case analysis and
puts lawyer Webster fully in the context of his age.
Alexis de Tocqueville's concept of the American lawyer, developed briefly in his Democracy in America, I suggest, provides
ANIEL WEBSTER WAS A GREAT LAWYER, as

* The research for this article was supported in part by a grant from
the University of Connecticut Research Foundation.
1 Materials for such a study exist. There is no complete body of Webster's legal papers available, but among the extensive Webster manuscripts (especially those in the New Hampshire Historical Society and
Dartmouth College Archives) there are valuable untapped materials,
legal and otherwise, which throw light on Webster the lawyer. Nearly
350 pages of Webster's most famous legal arguments have been printed
in the national edition of his writings and speeches. In many cases, too,
the U. S. Supreme Court Reports, Lawyer's Edition, contains summary
accounts of Webster's arguments. Maurice Baxter's forthcoming study of
Webster as a lawyer promises to pull these and other materials together
into a full and much-needed study of Webster's legal career.
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one such interpretive theme. When brought to bear on some old
and new facts, Tocqueville throws light on Webster's professional
and class connections and the relationship in his career between
law and politics which helps explain his greatness as both a lawyer
and statesman. Hopefully, in the process of applying Tocqueville
to Webster, the former's relevance to an understanding of the
nineteenth century bench and bar will be apparent.
Several of Tocqueville's insights are pertinent to the undertaking: First. He saw in the legal profession a class solidarity
based upon a respect (derived from the study of the common law)
for property and ordered change and intensified by a "certain
contempt" for ordinary people whose interests they arbitrated.
Second. The lawyer, he perceived, commanded the tools and the
language of political action, which in turn gave him a monopoly
of the judicial branches of the state and national governments
and a preponderance in the legislative branches. Law merged with
politics; lawyers became politicians. Third. Given their propensity
toward conservatism and their control of the political process, the
lawyer class naturally gravitated toward the economic elite, the
group that needed the lawyers and could pay the fees. In America,
where wealth and nobility were suspect, where there was no
"literary elite," the legal profession itself formed "the highest
political class and the most cultivated portion of society. ' 2 Lacking
the distasteful trappings of European high society, frequently
bound to the people by birth, lawyers became the only aristocrats
that a democracy could produce or tolerate.
Tocqueville's commentary was not news to contemporary
Americans. Long before he noted the connection between law and
the good life, hundreds of aspiring young Americans-varying in
persuasion from Alexander Hamilton to Andrew Jackson-had
sensed that legal learning opened the door to political power and
to economic and social prominence. Few grasped the message more
surely or acted on it more deliberately than a talented, ambitious
New Hampshire farm boy by the name of Daniel Webster. Rural
New Hampshire, he saw quickly, was a poor place either to learn
law or use it. After a halting start at legal apprenticeship in a
local law office (where black letter was too frequently relieved by
belles lettres-and pretty company), he pulled up stakes for larger
fields. Commercial, cosmopolitan, cultured, and powerful Boston
afforded all that ambition desired. In 1804, with no money and few
connections but with a large determination to learn some law and
2 Democracy in America, trans. Henry Reeve (2 vols., Vintage ed.,
1959), vol. 1, 288. Tocqueville's discussion of the American bench and bar
is found on pages 282-290.

1967

WEBSTER AS TOCQUEVILLE'S LAWYER

make his way into the Massachusetts power elite, Daniel Webster
went south.
The Boston law office of Christopher Gore was the ideal place,
legally and politically, to launch a career. Gore was one of the city's
most distinguished commercial lawyers and moved easily in the
rarefied atmosphere of Massachusetts high politics. With a fine
legal library at his disposal, with friendly, informed direction from
his mentor-and with the levity of earlier days appropriately subdued-Webster sharpened his legal tools and demonstrated his
Federalist orthodoxy. His usefulness to the cause of Federalism
became apparent, and he was, in Tocqueville's words, invited to
share the "family interests." Only a few of the old Tie Wigs reserved judgment.3
That a complementary fusion of law and politics aided Webster's
rise to prominence is suggested not only by the nature of his debut
into Federalist politics but by his simultaneous advancement in
both fields. 4 As he rose in the esteem of Federalist leaders after
1804, he acquired increasing status in the local, state, and federal
courts in New England. At the same time, in law and politics, he
moved on to the national arena-in 1813 as Federalist member of
the United States House of Representatives from New Hampshire
and in 1814 as counsel before the bar of the Supreme Court of the
United States.
In neither field, however, did he immediately lay claim to
national greatness. His politics were pertinaciously sectional and
his arguments before the Supreme Court, though competent and
promising, were not yet such as to bring national acclaim. Webster
needed a cause and an occasion to establish himself as a legal light
and a national statesman. Dartmouth College v. Woodward (1819)5
filled the bill exactly. The manner in which he exploited the potential of this opportunity puts his talents into sharper focus and
illuminates nicely the symbiotic nature of law and politics and the
unity and strength of the conservative portion of the bench and
bar.

3 "There is something about this man not exactly what one would
wish . . . ," observed Otis in 1819 as he assessed Webster's qualifications
for the "best class"; "for my part I believe the foundation is unstable
and I shall experience no surprise if the edifice trembles-I hope it may
not fall." H. G. Otis to Mrs. Otis, Jan. 18, 1819, H. G. Otis Papers, Mass.
Hist. Soc.
4Even during his early legal apprenticeship, he kept a finger in
politics by writing political tracts for local newspapers. Warren Dutton
to George Ticknor, n. d., Webster MSS, 000491, Dartmouth College Archives.
5 4 Wheat. 518 (1819).
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The College cause set a perfect stage for Webster, for it touched
the sensitive nerve ends of political conservatism and nascent industrial capitalism: the continuation of unfettered private educational institutions (many of which, like Dartmouth and Harvard,
were sympathetic to conservative principles and conscious of their
conservative responsibilities) ; and the power of democratic state
legislatures to meddle with private property and regulate corporate
rights. The audience was as formidable as the case was critical.
Already apprised of the issues at stake by the arguments in the
New Hampshire Supreme Court, 6 the "elite of the profession
throughout the country" crowded into the cramped chambers of the
Supreme Court. With a case and an audience like this, a man could
make his mark-or relegate himself to obscurity.
Webster was ready for fate. On March 10, 1818, he opened for
the College, for political conservatism, for economic nationalismand for Daniel Webster. For over four hours, "in the calm tone of
easy and dignified conversation," he unfolded an inimitable blend
of common sense, sound policy, and legal logic, playing deftly on
all the conservative issues at stake. Only for a brief moment (chosen
with an artist's sense of timing and pathos) did he descend from
law and policy to sentiment, confessing a loyal son's love of his
beleaguered school. Overcome by his own rhetoric, he returned to
his seat in tears.
Webster had risen to the challenge. Testimony has it that the
audience was with him. The Justices, too, had been captivated even
if all had not been convinced. Justice Story had been so engrossed
by Webster's performance that he had uncharacteristically not taken
a single note-though he sat poised, pen in hand.7 John Holmes,
whose incapacity accentuated Webster's brilliance, came on for the
state late the first day and finished the morning of the second;
William Wirt followed in the afternoon and completed his argument the next morning. Webster's colleague Joseph Hopkinsona "host" in himself-finished for the College with solid, unadorned
competence. The Court was divided and the case held over until
the following term. Victory was complete when Chief Justice
Marshall held for Dartmouth College in an opinion which went "the
whole length," and left, in Webster's words, "not an inch of ground
for the University to stand on." s
6Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 65 N. H. 473 (1817).
7 For the description of Webster's argument before the Court see

Chauncey A. Goodrich to Rufus Choate [photocopy], Nov. 25, 1852,
Webster MSS, 852625.1, Dart. Coll. Arch.
8 Daniel Webster to Ezekiel Webster, Feb. 2, 1819, The Writings and
Speeches of Daniel Webster, ed. James W. McIntyre, (18 vols., 1903), vol.
17, 300. Cited hereafter as Writings and Speeches.
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"We read, in the lives of several great lawyers," B. R. Curtis,
Jr. once observed, "of some occasion happily availed of for the display of powers until then unknown, and which has been the steppingstone to the subsequent career .... -9 The College case was Webster's
stepping-stone. Here in the national arena provided by the Supreme
Court, in a single "lucky hit," he paraded his mastery of conservative policy, his legal talent, and his oratorical power. Webster himself knew he had scored a great triumph. "Our College cause [he
wrote to Hopkinson] will be known to our children's children. Let
us take care that the rogues shall not be ashamed of their grandfathers."'1 Even H. G. Otis's skepticism about Webster's ability
and utility had been dispelled. Otis probably spoke for many of
the Massachusetts mercantile-industrial elite when he conceded
that Webster's "talents are of a high order ... and lie now for the
first time in a situation to display them to lucrative effect."' "
In looking to his reputation, Webster found professional unity
eminently serviceable. Indeed, in an age when there was no national
bar association and only incomplete and sporadic coverage of
Supreme Court activities, the natural channels of profession and
class were nearly indispensable vehicles for national fame. The
College cause set the current flowing through these channels in
behalf of conservative principles and their new champion. And by
the summer of 1818 public opinion had responded. "When I came
home," Webster observed on his return to New England, "I found
good wishes for our success, in almost all quarters . . . ." Good fortune needed to be prodded, however, and well wishers informed.
The prod and the information came in the form of a "printing"
(not a "publication," Webster was careful to point out) .of an outline of the cause as it was argued by Webster before the Supreme
Court. The production was for the discreet use of a "few friends,"
enabling them "to reason on the subject" and putting them "to
12
thinking a little.'
Those "few friends," now provided with a correct view of
things, began to utilize the ready-made social and professional
network. Hopkinson was sent "two of these things," one for his
own use and one for such among his "immediate friends" as he
9 B. R. Curtis, A Memoir of Benjamin Robbins Curtis (2 vols., 1879),
vol. 1, 85.
10 Webster to Hopkinson, March 22, 1819, Webster MSS 819222,
Dart. Coll. Arch.
11 H. G. Otis to Mrs. Otis, Jan. 26, 1819, H. G. Otis Papers, Mass.
Hist. Soc.
12 Webster to Joseph Hopkinson, July 3, 1818, Hopkinson Papers, Pa.
Hist. Soc.
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thought proper.' 3 Among these friends were the leading members
of the powerful Philadelphia bench and bar. Judge Story, who had
more legal connections and authority than any man in New England,
was also given copies. Jacob McGaw of Boston, a friend from
Webster's law apprenticeship days in New Hampshire, received the
"sketch" with the advice to show it "to any professional friend, in
your discretion," though "cautiously," Webster warned, since "general decorum, seems to prohibit the publishing of an argument,
while the cause is pending."' 14 A copy of the argument was even
given Dartmouth students, though Webster feared that, in their
"zeal in a good cause," they might "make an indiscreet use of it."'15
It went without saying that Webster's friends and fellow counsel in
the case, Jeremiah Mason and Judge Jeremiah Smith, were beating the drums in the North country.
New York had to be brought around, too. Francis Brown, president of Dartmouth and Webster's close adviser during the crisis,
was dispatched with copies of the printed argument to mobilize the
bench and bar of that state for his college and his friend Webster.
Chancellor James Kent, the behemoth of the profession in New York,
was the logical person for Brown to persuade first. Brown's success was complete. "There is no doubt," he reported back to Webster, "that by the Argument & the Charter he is brought completely
over to our side; & he has a full impression of the importance of
the question. I believe he will take every proper & prudent measure
to impart correct views to others." Brown took no chances, however, and carried his case personally not only to Governor DeWitt
Clinton but to all the "greatest legal talents of the State," conveniently present in Albany for the session of the New York Court
of Errors. The preponderance of the New York bench and bar,
Brown assured Webster, is "unquestionably in our favour. The
whole is," he added, "of course, attributable to you."' 6
Surveying the field from home ground four days later, Brown
was satisfied that "all the commanding men of New England & New
York" had been united "in one broad & impenetrable phalanx for
our defense & support." Indeed, the current of Northern opinion
was "setting so strongly towards the south, that we may safely
13 Webster to Joseph Hopkinson, Hopkinson Papers, op. cit. supra.
Note 12.
14 Daniel Webster to McGaw, July 27, 1818, Webster MSS 818427,
Dart. 'Coll. Arch.
15 Webster to Francis Brown, July 16, 1818, Writings and Speeches,
op. cit. supra. Note 8, at 284.
16 Brown to Webster, Sept. 15, 1818, Webster MSS 818515, Dart.
Coll. Arch.
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17
trust to its force alone to accomplish whatever is necessary."' This

current to the south, it might be added, was assuredly urged on by
Hopkinson's influence with Philadelphia friends and by B. J. Gilbert's proselytizing mission (with the charter in hand) to Chief
Justice Marshall in Richmond.' 8 Thus, within four months from his
argument before the Court, the case for Webster's principles and
prowess had received a national hearing through the professional
grapevine. In an age when it took two weeks to get from Maine to
Georgia, if the weather was good, this was some accomplishment.
The conservative professional elite did more than advertise
Webster's greatness. It offered him, as a prerogative of his position as leader of the bar and legal spokesman for the gathering
forces of corporate capitalism, generous access to the reservoir
of legal talent. Cooperation among lawyers, of course, was the
common practice, and Webster had acquired the habit early in his
career. But the importance and fame of the College cause expanded
Webster's network of connections to include many national leaders
of the bench and bar. Their efforts, in fact, contributed measureably to his victory in that case, and the pattern of cooperation
established continued to sustain his professional and political
reputation for the rest of his life.
In the College cause, Jeremiah Smith and Jeremiah Mason,
two of New England's most accomplished lawyers, gave indispensable support to Webster.' 9 They had, with some modest help from
Webster, handled the cause before the New Hampshire Supreme
Court. With the full knowledge that his own preparation was inadequate, but with the comforting assurance that the labors and
talents of Mason and Smith would be at his disposal, Webster agreed
to take the case to Washington. "Judge Smith has written to me,"
he wrote candidly to Mason, "that I must take some part in the
17 Brown to Webster, Sept. 19, 1818, Webster MSS 818519, Dart.

Coll. Arch.
18 Gilbert was apparently unable to see Marshall but saw to it that
the Chief Justice got a copy of the charter and that the case for the College got into the newspapers. Charles G. Haines, The Role of the Supreme
Court in American Government and Politics 1789-1885 (1960), 401.
19 "If you asked me who is the greatest lawyer I have known," Webster once remarked, "I should say Chief Justice Marshall, but if you took
me by the throat and pushed me to the wall, I should say Jeremiah
Mason." Quoted in Aumann, The Changing American Legal System, 165.
As for Judge Smith's knowledge of the law, "he knows so much more of
it than I do, or ever shall," confessed Webster, "that I forbear to speak on
that point." Webster to Chancellor Kent, May 23, 1825, Writings and
Speeches, op. cit. supra. Note 8, at 384.
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argument of this college question. I have not thought of the subject, nor made the least preparation; I am sure I can do no good,
and must, therefore, beg that you and he will follow up in your
20
own manner, the blows which have already been so well struck.
Immediately he began to draw on his credit. "If it is not too
troublesome," he added, "please let Mr. Fales give me a naked list
of the authorities cited by you, and I will look at them before court.
21
I do this that I may be able to understand you and Judge Smith."
Two months after this appetizer, he was ready for the full course.
"If I go to Washington, and have this cause on my shoulders, I must
have your brief, which I should get of course without difficulty, and
Judge Smith's. ' 22 With disarming candor, calculated exaggeration,
and friendly flattery, he brought Judge Smith to the task at hand.
"If I argue this cause at Washington, every one knows I can only
be the reciter of the argument made by you at Exeter. You are,
therefore, principally interested, as to the matter of reputation, in
the figure I make at Washington. Nothing will be expected of me
but decent delivery of your matter." 23 To guarantee that "decent
delivery," to insure Smith's reputation-and to help make his own
24
-Webster requested Smith's notes on the case, "all of them."
In the legal battle which raged on after the Court's inability
to decide the cause in the 1818 term, Webster received a discreet
bit of tactical direction from none other than Justice Joseph Story.
Given their mutual dedication to the law and their agreement on
the New England version of political-economic policy, it was natural
that they should have established a close friendship. That friendship, because of the Judge's immense talent, his limitless energy,
and his deep concern for the establishment of sound conservative
principles of government, began to work for Webster as early as
1816.25 The threat to Dartmouth, private education in general, and
corporate property at the hands of state legislatures deepened their
working relationship.
20 Webster to Mason, Sept. 4, 1817, Writings and Speeches, op. cit.
supra. Note 8, at 266.
21 Webster to Mason, Writings and Speeches, op. cit. supra. Note 8, at
266.
22 Webster to Mason, Nov. 27, 1817, Writings and Speeches, op. cit.
supra. Note 8, at 266.
23 Webster to Smith, Dec. 8, 1817, Writings and Speeches, op. cit.
8upra. Note 8, at 268.
24 Webster to Smith, Jan. 9, 1818, Writings and Speeches, op. cit.
supra. Note 8, at 269.
25 See, for example, Webster to Story, Dec. 9, 1816, Mass. Hist. Soc.,
Proceedings,2d Series, vol. 14, 399.
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Whether Story consulted with counsel for the College before
the argument at Washington in March, 1818, is uncertain, though
there is some evidence that he did. 26 There is no doubt that, in the
summer following the argument, while the Court's decision was
pending and with the possibility of new arguments, he extended a
useful helping hand to Webster and Dartmouth. Story was one of
those "few friends" who received copies of the printed outline of
Webster's argument: "send one of them to each of such Judges as
you think proper . . . " Webster suggested. 27 Story, in fact, urged
Webster to publish a full account of the case so that the whole profession might understand the great issues at stake-and proofread the production for him. 28
More valuable yet was Story's advice to Webster on the strategy
of the litigation. From the outset, Webster had regretted that the
case before the Supreme Court, coming up as it did on a writ of
error, was limited to the question of whether the New Hampshire
law regulating the College government was repugnant to the contract clause of the United States Constitution. 29 A cause which
broached the whole issue of legislative encroachment on vested
rights would have afforded a better opportunity for a conclusive
victory.30 The Court's indecision after the first argument and the
knowledge that the formidable William Pinkney had been retained
26 "1 saw Judge Story as he went on," wrote Webster to Mason, Jan.,
1818, previous to the argument before the Supreme Court. "He said he
had had a correspondence with you about 'things'; but company being
present, did not say what things." Jan., n.d., 1818, Writings and Speeches,
op. cit. supra. Note 8, at 271.
27 Webster to Story, Sept. 9, 1818, Writings and Speeches, op. cit.
supra. Note 8, at 287.
28 Haines, op. cit. supra. Note 18, at 415.
29 Webster to Smith, Dec. 8, 1817, Writings and Speeches, op. cit.
supra. Note 8, at 267.
BOIn fact, in his argument before the Court, he ranged far beyond
the technical limits of the constitutional question and was sharply criticized for having done so. "Mr. Webster did not confine himself to the
case stated . . . " noted Salma 'Hale to Levi Woodbury, -March 17, 1818,
Gist Blair Collection, Lib. of iCong. Earlier Hale had spoken of Webster's
opening arguments as "very disingenuous." Hale to Woodbury, March 11,
1818, Gist Blair Collection, Lib. of Cong. Webster was sensitive to the
charge. "The rogues here in congress, complain that the cause was put on
grounds not stated in the court below," he noted to Smith, March 14,
1818, Writings and Speeches, op. cit supra. Note 8, at 277. It might be
added that Story obliged Webster's latitudinous efforts with an equally
wide-ranging concurring opinion based on, among other things, the
doctrine of implied limitations. Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat.
666-713, especially 694-695.
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to reargue the case against the College at the 1819 term made the
31
notion of a broader-based case even more attractive.
As early as December 8, 1817, Webster had considered bringing the cause into the United States circuit court on diversity of
citizenship jurisdiction where a division pro forma of the district
and circuit judges, if it could be arranged, would bring "the whole
question" before the Supreme Court. 32 Story seems to have been
consulted at this early stage, for Webster remarked that he had
"thought of this the more, from hearing sundry sayings of a great
personage. ' 33 By the next spring the strategy had matured: "Judge
Story has been recently in town," wrote Webster to Mason, April
23, 1818, "I have no doubt he will incline to send up the new cause
in the most convenient manner, without giving any opinion, and
probably without argument. If the district judge will agree to
divide without argument, pro forma, I think Judge Story will incline
' 34
so to dispose of the cause.
Five days later, when Webster wrote to Mason, the matter
seemed to be settled: "I saw Judge Story as I came along. He is
evidently expecting a case which shall present all the questions." 35
By midsummer, Webster informed his colleague Joseph Hopkinson
that the strategy had been executed with every prospect of success: "The new actions are brought; & are in a fair way to go up,
in a favorable shape the next term. There was a good deal of ingenious painstaking to defeat the suits by abatement &c, but without success. The Judge said it was important that a cause should
go up, embracing all the questions. I should not have great doubt of
'' 36
his opinion, when we get the questions fairly & broadly up.
31 For an excellent discussion of the whole question of possible reargument, see Maurice G. Baxter, "Should the Dartmouth College Case
Have Been Reargued?," New England Quarterly, vol. 33 (March, 1960),
19-36.
32 Webster to Smith, Dec. 8, 1817, Writings and Speeches, op. cit. supra. Note 8, at 267. Baxter's article, "Should the Dartmouth College Case
Have Been Reargued?", contains a lucid discussion of the cognate causes.
33 Webster to Smith, Dec. 8, 1817, Writings and Speeches, op. cit.
supra. Note 8, at 267.
34 Webster to Mason, April 23, 1818, Writings and Speeches, op. cit.
supra. Note 8, at 281.
35 Webster to Mason, April 28, 1818, Writings and Speeches, op. cit.
supra. Note 8, at 282.
36 Webster to Hopkinson, July 3, 1818, Hopkinson Papers, Pa. Hist.
Soc. The cognate cases (not reported in Federal Cases) brought in the
circuit court at Portsmouth in May, 1818, were Hatch v. Lang; Pierce ex
dem. Lyman v. Gilbert; March v. Allen. Baxter, op. cit. supra. Note 31, at
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The Court's refusal at the February term to hear new arguments and Chief Justice Marshall's sweeping interpretation of the
contract clause of the Constitution as a shield against legislative
interference with corporate property made the strategy of the
cognate cases superfluous. Their continuation might, in fact, have
proved dangerous to the College, since counsel for the University
had begun to gather new data purporting to establish the public
nature of the institution and thus proving the legality of state control. Judge Story, encountering the cases at the May, 1819 term of
the Circuit Court at Portsmouth, relieved the danger by disposing
of them according to the Supreme Court decision-despite the fact
37
that he had labored for their introduction.
The Dartmouth College cause in the large sense was obviously
something more than Webster's show. His dependence on Mason
and Smith for his law was substantial, though no more than the
ethics and practice of advocacy allowed. Legal strategy, too, was
collective and included the subtle guiding hand of Justice Story.
The Supreme Court's favorable ruling itself was due as much or
more to the brilliant and bold improvisations of Marshall on the
contract clause as to the arguments of counsel. Finally, the educative impact of the case on professional and public minds, the spread
of conservative principles of law and political-economy, including
the advertisement of their new spokesman, was in the largest sense
the collective accomplishment of a unified and conservative professional elite. Webster, as we have seen, did not disguise, to himself
or to his friends, the extent of his indebtedness. No public acknowledgment was made, however, and contemporaries bestowed the
laurels of victory on him alone. But the ironical truth remains that
the influential College case-and Webster's career launchingwere really a joint venture which brought into action a powerful
arm of Tocqueville's legal aristocracy.
After the College debut, Webster rose rapidly in both law and
politics. In the decade after 1819 he argued seventy-two Supreme
Court cases, including the most important ones. By the early thirties he had become the spokesman for New England's politicaleconomic version of nationalism. For services rendered, he succeeded James Otis, Sam Adams, and Theophilus Parsons as "Pope"
of Boston. 38 As he defended New England policy against Southern
37 In short, Story refused to admit that the "new facts" of counsel
for the University altered the private nature of the corporation as
established by the charter. Baxter, op. cit. supra. Note 36, at 29.
38 B. Waterhouse to Levi Woodbury, Feb. 9, 1835, Papers of Levi
Woodbury, Lib. of Cong.
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objections, he emerged as the champion of Union and "expounder
of the Constitution." It was as a prerogative of this lofty position
that Webster was allowed to draw freely, a la mode Dartmouth
College v. Woodward, on the talents of the "church"-as Henry
Adams called the commercial-professional elite. For the fact is that
the talented reserves called into action in the Dartmouth College
crisis had not been allowed to disband but had been augmented and
kept active in behalf of conservative nationalism and Daniel Webster. The political crusades in which this body of the faithful
served their political pontiff were among the most vital of the age.
None was more so than the conservative struggle to contain the
invading forces of Jacksonian Democracy. The citadel to be defended at all costs was the Second Bank of the United States. Because of its wealth, power, and complex legal business, the Bank
commanded an imposing phalanx of legal talent.39 Webster made
his legal debut into this exclusive professional group as counsel for
the Bank in McCulloch v. Maryland (1819), and from that time on
was for practical purposes under permanent retainer 4 0 -one of the
"forty two pounders," as Nicholas Biddle once put it. Under the
presidency of Biddle (1823-1836), he became, along with John
Sergeant, a kind of major domo in the Bank's legal house, advising
Biddle, directing legal strategy, arguing cases, and procuring legal
talent for the Bank. When the institution became the political battleground of the 1830's (which it did in part because of Webster's
advice), he became its stalwart champion in the United States
Senate. In both the legal and political phases of the Bank Warand the two were inextricably fused-Webster turned for sustenance to fellow members of the conservative establishment.
Judge Joseph Hopkinson, Webster's colleague in the College
39 In addition to Webster, the 2d Bank of the United States counted
heavily on such legal heavyweights as William Pinkney (who won the day
in McCulloch v. Maryland, the Bank's greatest victory) and the powerful
Philadelphians, Horace Binney and John Sergeant. (For example, see
their folders in the Simon Gratz Collection, Pa. Hist. Soc.) Attorney
General of the United States William Wirt (who was allowed private
practice) was a powerful and consistent legal counsel for the Bank. "I
have been engaged in important business for the Bank of the U. S. &
several of its branches," he wrote in 1822, "and in no case yet against
them." Wirt to John White, April 13, 1822, Letter Book, May 10, 1816July 26, 1832, Wirt Papers, Lib. of Cong. He would not appear against
the Bank, he added, without first giving it the option of his services.
40 Webster was sensitive about his close connection with the Bank,
especially during the Bank War when his connection was publicized:
Webster to Nicholas Biddle, July 1, 1831, Webster MSS 831401.1, Dart.
Coll. Arch.
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cause, was among those recruited. "Will you do me the favour to
read the reasons of the Secretary," wrote Webster in reference to
Secretary of the Treasurery Taney's removal of the public money
41
from the Bank, "and give me your thoughts on one or two topics."
To have refused would have been ungrateful in the extreme, since
it was largely due to Webster's efforts that Hopkinson became judge
42
for the eastern district of Pennsylvania.
Justice Joseph Story, another veteran of the College battle, was
even more formidable support against Jackson's Bank policy. "You
may have seen that [veto] message," Webster wrote to the Judge
on July 21, 1832:
My wish is to give a full answer to its trash on the Constitutional question. That is Taney's work. The argument, you
perceive is, that some powers of the Bank are not necessary,
and so not Constitutional. Now, my dear Sir, the object of this
is to request you to turn to the message, read this part of it,
& give me in a letter of three pages a close & conclusive confutation, in your way, of all its nonsense in this particular.
43
It will take you less than half an hour.
Story's reply was probably among the Story letters which Webster
destroyed.44 In answer to another request, however, Story forwarded to Webster, on December 25, 1833, a detailed legal and
political argument against the President's power of removal of the
deposits and the illegality of depositing public funds in the state
banks. 45 Webster incorporated Story's advice into his powerful
Senate speech of May 7, 1834, in reply to Jackson's protest against
46
his censure by the Senate.
In another phase of the struggle, the conservative counter41

Webster to Hopkinson, Dec. 18, 1833. Hopkinson Papers, Pa. Hist.

Soc.
42 Although out of the domain of his Senatorial influence, Webster
worked assiduously for Hopkinson's appointment. Richard Peters wrote
Hopkinson, Feb. 12, 1829, with "good hopes" for Senatorial confirmation
of his nomination, and added that "Webster is working all he can, and he
is a giant when he gets to work." Hopkinson Papers, Pa. Hist. Soc.
43
Webster to Story, July 21, 1832, Mass. Hist. Soc., Proceedings,
2d Series, vol. 14, 408-409.
44 On Webster's refusal to release the Story letters in his possession,
see Life and Letters of Joseph Story, ed. W. W. Story (2 vols. 1851), vol.
2, 408. Hereafter cited as Life and Letters.
45 Story to Webster, Dec. 25, 1833, Life and Letters, op. cit. supra.
Note 44, at 155-158.
46 "The Presidential Protest," Writings and Speeches, op. cit. supra.
Note 8, vol. 8 at 105-108.
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attack against the President's right to remove office holders, Webster sought authoritative constitutional arguments from Chancellor
James Kent. After politely disclaiming the right "to instruct a
Senatorial Statesman, who has thought on the subject infinitely
more than I have," the Chancellor proceeded so to instruct.4

7

Judge

Hopkinson was dunned again for "a very rough draft of a few
48
propositions" on the President's removal power.
The counter-offensive against Jackson was no sooner launched
than a second, even more portentous challenge to orthodoxy-nullification-faced Webster. Now fighting on two fronts, he turned
again to America's great conservative legal mind, Chancellor Kent.
(Judge Story, it was rumored, did not even wait for a summons
but volunteered to pass the legal ammunition to Webster.) 49 Chancellor Kent's role was simple but important: The strategy, Webster
wrote him, was to "feign that I have rec'd a letter from you, calling my attention to Mr. Calhoun's publication, and then, in answer
to such supposed letter, to proceed to review his whole argument,
at some length, not in the style of a speech, but in that of a cool
constitutional & legal discussion." "The crisis is indeed portentous
and frightful," responded Kent; in this "great battle of Armageddon," he would deem it an "honor" to march under Webster's flag. 50
The working relationship between Webster and his friends was
not limited to the great issues of the Bank and states rights. He
continued to call for and get support on public questions of state,
national, and international moment. This pattern of cooperation,
which touched private politics as well as public policy, lasted until
the end of his career and included some of the nation's most distinguished and powerful professional and economic leaders. A full
account of such activities is impossible. Most of the collaboration
was undoubtedly done in private conversation and unrecorded; of
that which was recorded, much has been lost or destroyed and the
remainder is scattered. But a sampling of what remains attests
to the impressive scope of Webster's connections and the advantage
they offered him.
In his much esteemed defense of Harvard College in the Massa47

Kent to Webster, Jan. 21, 1830 [copy]. Papers of James Kent, Lib.

of Cong.
48 Webster to Hopkinson, Friday eve., 11 o'clock, n. d., Hopkinson
Papers, Pa. Hist. Soc.
49 Peter Harvey, Reminiscences and Anecdotes of Daniel Webster
(1877), 156.
5OWebster to Kent, Oct. 29, 1832; Kent to Webster, Oct. 31, 1832,
Papersof James Kent, Lib. of Cong.

1967

WEBSTER AS TOCQUEVILLE'S LAWYER

chusetts Constitutional Convention of 1820, for example, Webster
expeditiously used his connections with John Lowell-apparently
without sufficient acknowledgment. "Mr. Webster's celebrated report in favor of the College," noted the unacknowledged author
in understandable dudgeon, "was, but an amplification (with some
beautifull [sic] sentences, and sound thoughts) of my written
argument"-the one which Webster had previously requested. 5 ' On
national questions like the tariff Webster turned to those who knew.
Abbott Lawrence freely supplied him with ideas; H. G. Otis did
the same with principles and details. 52 From Judge Hopkinson he
sought out, and undoubtedly got, an informed view of the precarious
structure of tariff politics. 53 Webster ranged widely for assistance
in forensic and legislative efforts. Edward Everett gave him sources,
substance, and inspiration on the Greek independence movement
which Webster brilliantly championed in the House of Representatives. "I feel now as if I could make a pretty good speech for
my friends the Greeks," he wrote Everett, on December 21, 1823,
"but I shall get cool in fourteen days, unless you keep up my temperature." 54 'The day following his request to Everett, he asked
his old friend Jeremiah Mason to read the Report of the Judiciary
Committee of the House of Representatives "on the subject of
Courts" and to "write me your opinion, freely, thereon ... " Mason
promptly sent back a detailed and erudite report.55
Clearly the most useful of Webster's conservative acquaintances was Justice Story. 56 Bound together by principle and affection, they worked for conservative truth in law, high politics, legislation, and foreign affairs. Habits of cooperation which began in
the College case were, as we have seen, continued in the Bank crisis.
Story's brilliant drafting abilities, too, were at Webster's command
and included such large matters as bankruptcy legislation, the
Crimes Act of 1825, and the Judicial Reorganization Act of 182551John Lowell to a medical professor [James Jackson?], Nov. 22,
1831, CorporationPapers, Harvard University Archives.
52 Lawrence to Webster, May 7, 1828, Webster Papers, N. H. Hist.
Soc. Otis to Webster, Feb. 18, 1833, Webster Papers, N. H. Hist. Soc.
53 Webster to Hopkinson, Dec. 9, 1833, Hopkinson Papers, Pa. Hist.
Soc.
54 Webster to Everett, Dec. 21, 1823, Writings and Speeches, op. cit.
supra. Note 8, at 336.
55
Webster to Mason, Dec. 22, 1823 [copy]; Mason to Webster, Dec.
29, 1823, Webster Papers,N. H. Hist. Soc.
56 The Webster-Story relationship was explored in a different context
in my article, "A Note on the Whig Politics of Justice Joseph Story,"
Mississippi Valley HistoricalReview, vol. 48 (Dec., 1961), 480-491.
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26.67 On hot political issues like internal improvements and the
8
Dorr Rebellion, the Judge was on hand with arguments and policy.
On occasion Story even supplied Webster with "thunder for his
speeches," as Theodore Parker put it: "Help me make a speech,"
Webster implored, "I wish to say something on this N.E. boundary;
& desire to be able to resist, in limne, both in English and American
authorities, one of the principal preliminary grounds taken by the
English diplomatists." 59 Story did more in the Ashburton negotiations than speechify; he supplied answers to complex legal questions concerning the Creole affair, furnished drafts of treaty articles
on extradition, gave legal advice on the McLeod controversy, and
in general provided Webster with needed legal and historical information.60 "You can do more for me than all the rest of the
world," Webster once wrote,61 and there is no reason to challenge
this generous assessment of his friend's services.
The same men who aided Webster in matters of high politics
nourished his private enterprises as well. While admitting to Jeremiah Mason that the "practice of asking the advice of friends in
one's own affairs, is a little old fashioned," 6 2 he called for such
advice. Nicholas Biddle even without being asked felt free to proffer political advice: "Do not leave your present position," he insisted
during the cabinet crisis of 1843, "If you do, you descend." 6 Judge
Story, too, impressed with the dual threat of Jacksonianism and
57 "I should feel greatly obliged to you," wrote Webster, "if in the
multitude of your concerns you could find time to make a dft. [draft] of
a Bankrupt Law. I am pledged to do something on that subject and
mean to bring it forward early in the session.... As far as convenient
please place references in margin." Webster to Story, Nov. 10, 1825,
Mass. Hist. Soc., Proceedings, 2d Series, vol. 14, 405. For their cooperation in the Crimes Act and Judicial Reorganization Act see: Life and
Letters, op. cit. supra. Note 44, vol. 1 at 440; Webster to Story, Dec. 9,
1816, Mass. Hist. Soc., Proceedings, 2d Series, vol. 14, 399; Webster to
Story, Dec. 26, 1826, Writings and Speeches, op. cit. supra. Note 8 at 412413.
58 Webster to Story, April 13, 1828, Story Papers, Lib. of Cong.;
Story to Webster, April 26, 1842, Webster Papers, N. H. Hist. Soc.
59 Webster to Story, May 12, 1838, Mass. Hist. Soc., Proceedings, 2d
Series, vol. 14, 409.
60 Story to Webster, March 26, and April 19, 1842, Writings and
Speeches, op. cit. supra. Note 8, vol. 16 at 364-365, 368-369.
61 Webster to Story, April 9, 1842, Mass. Hist. Soc., Proceedings, 2d
Series, vol. 14, 410.
62 Webster to Mason, March 20, 1828, Writings and Speeches, op. cit.
supra. Note, vol. 16 at 175.
6 Biddle to Webster, Feb. 27, 1843, Webster Papers, Lib. of Cong.
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Calhounism, came to the personal support of Webster in a eulogistic
article in the New England Magazine.64 And the commercial elite,
whose interests Webster so frequently pleaded, rallied in support
of his personal political career when the collapse of his improvident
land speculations in the wake of the depression of 1837 threatened
to keep him from the Senate. Capitalists in Boston and New York
magnanimously raised $100,000 by subscription to sustain their
impoverished spokesman-apparently retaining him in politics as
they had in law.65
In assessing Webster's membership in Tocqueville's American
aristocracy, one is immediately struck with the truth of Edward
Everett's observation that "Every one must feel that, in the case of
Mr. Webster, the lawyer and the statesman have contributed materially to form each other." 66 In the House and Senate and as Secretary of State, knowledge of the law provided him with the arguments, rhetoric, and expertise essential to political action. At the
bar his mastery of high policy added depth and persuasiveness to
-and sometimes substituted for-his legal arguments. Finally, the
relationship of politics and law and the expeditious implementation
of it permitted him to bolster his own great ability with the talents
of a conservative professional elite and the power of a unified
economic class.
The irony, frequently ignored, is that this dual role of lawyerpolitician which effectually advanced his statesmanship detracted
from his legal accomplishments, his high historical reputation to
the contrary notwithstanding. Webster's problem was that he attempted to pursue both law and politics exactly at the time when
both were becoming specialized, full time professions. Webster
himself recognized the dilemma. "I find I am growing rusty in general knowledge," he wrote his friend Story in 1822, even before
he formally re-entered politics, "& unless I can find or make some
64 [Joseph Story], "Statesmen-Their Rareness and Importance.
Daniel Webster," New England Magazine, vol. 7 (Aug., 1834), 89-104.
65 "The project," wrote H. G. Otis about the Webster slush fund, "is
to raise a fund of 100,000 dollars here and in N. York, the income to
be settled on him and his wife for life .... It is confidently said that it
will be filled, indeed is mainly so at the moment." Otis added that this was
the third time "that the wind has been raised for him. . . ." Otis to G.
Harrison, Feb. 7, 1845, H. G. Otis Papers, Mass. Hist. Soc. Webster's
intimate connections with New York and Boston capitalists were no
secret to contemporaries and must have fortified the suspicions of many
about the aristocratic nature of the legal elite. C. W. Woodbury to Levi
Woodbury, May 25, 1841, Papers of Levi Woodbury, Lib. of Cong.
66 "Memoir of Daniel Webster," Writings and Speeches, op. cit.
supra. Note 8, vol. 1 at 49.
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leisure from my office, I shall shortly be neither more nor less than
an attorney."6 By 1835, the frustration of squeezing two careers
into one came to a climax, and a choice between law and politics
seemed imperative. "As I am circumstanced at present," he complained to William Sullivan, "I cannot practise extensively in the
Supreme Court, because I cannot leave the Senate long enough to
go through an important cause. Non possumus omnia. I must leave
off saying, 'Mr. President,' or leave off saying, 'May it please your
Honors,' . . ."6s To choose was difficult but "habits . . . and the

nature of my pursuits for some years," he confessed to Mason,
"render it more agreeable to me to attend to political than to professional subjects." 69 The collapse of investment schemes by which
he hoped to relieve entirely the necessity of professional business
thwarted his plan to leave the courts, and he spent the remainder
of his life in frustrated attendance on them.
Webster's failure to extricate himself from too many professions contributed measurably to a decline in professional competence. As early as 1830, the pressure had begun to tell, as a
humorous encounter with his great and friendly rival William
Wirt indicates. In the midst of arguments before the Supreme
Court in the important Astor cause,70 Webster got a postponement
on the ground that he was confined to bed with illness. Wirt, in
genuine Southern style, called to commiserate and, to his amazement, found Webster, as he recalled, "over his law books preparing
71
his answer to my speech."
When such gentle deceits and last-minute cramming failed,
the results were apt to be disastrous. Charles Sumner, fresh from
Story's law classes, full of new-learned law and high professional
ideals, caught Webster in one such moment of truth. In the case of
Binney v. The Chesapeake and Ohio Canal Co. (1834),72 Sumner reported, perhaps a little too triumphantly, back to the law school,
67 Webster to Story, Sept., n. d., 1822, Writings and Speeches, op. cit.
supra. Note 8, vol. 16 at 70.

68 Webster to William Sullivan, Feb. 23, 1835, Writings and Speeches, op. cit. supra. Note 8, vol. 18 at 10.
69 He determined not to accept engagements before the Supreme

Court "unless under special circumstances." Webster to Mason, Feb. 6,
1835, Writings and Speeches, op. cit. supea. Note 8, vol. 16 at 252. After
1835, in fact, Webster averaged 3.06 Supreme Court cases per year as
against 7. 55 per year for the peak period, 1820-1830.
70

Carverv. Jackson, 4 Pet. 1 (1830).

71 William Wirt to Elizabeth Wirt, Feb. 6, 1830, Wirt Papers, Md.

Hist. Soc.
72 8 Pet. 201.
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that Webster was "doing the labor in court which should have been
done out of court . . . All here declare that he has neglected his

cases this term in a remarkable manner. It is now whispered in
the room that he has not looked at the present case, though the
amount at stake is estimated at half a million dollars." Sumner's
assessment that "politics have entirely swamped his whole time and
talents" is straight to the point. 73 The extensive dependence on
friends recorded in Webster's correspondence in matters of private
and public law (only a part of which has been referred to) serves
to corroborate Sumner's judgment-and further illustrates the
value to Webster of his professional connections.
As for a realistic evaluation of Webster's legal attainments,
Benjamin Waterhouse's assessment rings true: "He is a very good
Lawyer, but there never was yet a very learned and able lawyer,
who was at the same time an able politician. ' 74 Refining Waterhouse's evaluation a bit, one might admit the brilliance and the impact of Webster's great moments and his unsurpassed force in questions of constitutional policy and yet, in light of the evidence, ques-

tion the accuracy of his reputation as the leading lawyer of the age,
the undisputed head of the federal bar. Surely the picture of Jupiter striking down his foes-the devil himself not excluded-with
his own profound legal lightning does not correspond to the facts,
say, of the College cause, or of his confessedly frustrated professional life and his consequent embarrassing dependence on his
friends for legal advice.
Nor was the problem only Webster's political distractions. In
response to the national and international expansion of commerce,
the rise of corporate capitalism, and the general increase in social
complexity, American jurisprudence was becoming technical, sophisticated, and voluminous. The old ideal American lawyer, the practitioner who was at home in all branches of jurisprudence, in the
classics, history, and belles lettres as well, and who dipped into
politics and statecraft for breadth of vision, was retreating before
the formally trained, full-time expert, as Webster's disastrous encounter with Horace Binney and John Sergeant in the famous
Girard will case, Vidal et al. v. Philadelphia (1844), illustrates.
Though the specialist did not make his appearance until the postCivil War period, Webster was caught up in the first stages of the
transition. His practice of farming out legal business, of garnering
73

Sumner to Professor Simon Greenleaf, March 3, 1834, Memoir

and Letters of Charles Sumner, ed. Edward Pierce (4 vols., 1877-1893),
vol. 1, 135.
74

Waterhouse to Levi Woodbury, Feb. 9, 1835, Papers of Levi Wood-

bury, Lib. of Cong.
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law from his professional friends (one which resembled the British
solicitor-barrister relationship and prefigured the modern multiman law establishment) was, in fact, partly a response to the rising complexity of the law. That he held on in both law and politics,
even with his improvisations, is a tribute to his genius.
Webster's preeminence as a lawyer's lawyer may be open to
question; his greatness as a lawyer-politician is not. The pattern
of widespread dependence on others in law and politics, viewed in
another way, points up the broad base of power which he commanded. Basic to the exercise of that power was Webster's flawless
employment of the functional relationship between law and commercial-industrial capitalism. Both as lawyer and politician, he was
a broker between the capitalist interest group and the power of
the state. In this capacity, his genius was not in technical, scientific
law but in applied law, not in speculative political theory but in
belly politics, not in idealism but in functionalism and expediency.
Behind his great moments in constitutional argumentation was an
inimitable appropriation of law to high policy.
That American law should have so expeditiously served his
political ends says much about the nature of ante-bellum jurisprudence. For all its scientific and technical aspirations, its rhetoric
of morality and natural law, it was preeminently practical. It was
an earthbound vehicle which carried the needs and aspirations of
the American people-or rather of those special interest groups
into which that people was divided and which were strong enough
to be heard. Of those interest groups, the most dynamic and unified in purpose was commercial-industrial capitalism. Webster's
amalgamation of law, politics, and economics made him indispensable to this class and thus the prototype (and possibly the model)
of Tocqueville's lawyer. For basic to Tocqueville's idea of the American aristocracy was the recognition of the functional nature of
American law and the union of legal expertise with economic class.
Given the relatively uninstitutionalized nature of American society,
such a power elite left an impression on public policy disproportionate to its numbers.
Tocqueville's thesis, with Webster as a case in point, suggests
the need and possibility of further investigation. His brief discussion, of course, wants qualification and refinement. A picture of a
legal establishment as exclusively aristocratic will not suffice in an
age when admission to the fraternity was without serious restriction. To categorize the legal profession as uniformly conservative
and consistently anti-democratic is equally untenable when lawyers
clearly peopled both parties and championed all varieties of political-economic policy. Yet, there seems strong evidence that an iden-
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tifiable, self-conscious, and dominant portion of the profession was
found consistently in collusion with the advance guard of commercial and industrial capitalism and that this union was and continued to be a power to reckon with. If this is true, the theory of
a classless society, operating in a climate of consensus-continuity,
extracted from Tocqueville by recent scholars, seems in need of
modification, at least in regard to the source and exercise of social
power-as it was in fact tentatively modified by the master himself. The possibility deserves further study.

